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This paper reviews how income-support systems affect labour force participation in the 
UK. The UK’s approach to social insurance is “basic security”, with modest, typically 
flat-rate, benefits; insurance-based benefits are relatively unimportant. Compared with 
the EU, the UK has high employment rates, but a high proportion of non-workers say 
that they are not working through disability. In general, the low generosity of out-of-
work benefits means that positive incentives to work exist for almost all benefit recipi-
ents, but weak work incentives exist for those receive Housing Benefit, and for primary 
earners in couples who have low earnings. Recent reforms to strengthen work incentives 
have altered the in-work tax credits, rather than the benefit system, and recent reforms 
to the out-of-work benefits have involved toughening and extending job-search re-
quirements. The two main political parties seem to agree that future reforms will in-
volve more conditionality, a greater use of the private sector, and a unification of the 
different labour market programmes.  
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1  Introduction 
When designing income-support systems (or social security benefits), there is invariably 
a trade-off between providing sufficient support to those with no other sources of in-
come, minimising the cost to the taxpayer, and providing incentives for recipients to in-
crease their earnings. In addition, certain income-support systems may be associated 
with active labour market programmes, or conditionality of some form, which may im-
prove recipients’ chances of finding a job, or provide them with an incentive (either a 
“carrot” or a “stick”) to do so. The purpose of this chapter is to describe how income-
support systems in the UK affect labour force participation.   
The paper is organised as follows. As the paper was commissioned as one of 6 about 
different EU countries, Section 2 provides background on key employment trends in the 
UK, and on the design of the social security system. Section 3 describes recent changes 
to social security benefits, and to tax credits, which, by affecting in-work incomes, are 
important in determining the financial incentive to work for recipients of social security 
benefits. It will be seen that these reforms divide neatly into two: reforms which in-
crease the requirements placed upon recipients of out-of-work benefits, and reforms to 
in-work benefits or credits in order to improve financial incentive to be in work. Sec-
tion 4 presents evidence, where available, from evaluations of the net impact of these re-
forms. Section 5 concludes, discussing what reforms are likely in the UK over the next 
five years regardless of which party might be in government following the expected 
spring 2010 election, and what other countries might be able to learn.  
To try to avoid confusion, the full names of benefits are given in italics with capital 
letters, or as abbreviations. For example, there is a specific social security benefit in the 
UK called Income Support. The phrase “income support systems” without capitals 
should be understood to refer to all social security benefits in general in the UK. 
2  Background 
2.1   Basic facts on employment 
Analysis of data from the European LFS compiled for this project by Applica/Alpha-
metrics shows that the UK has: 4  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation? 
•  higher employment rates for men and women, with correspondingly lower inac-
tivity, than the EU average; 
•  seen a decline in the employment rate of men since 1990 (compared with no 
change in the EU, on average), and seen a smaller rise in the employment rate 
of women than the EU average, but from a higher base. 
•  an unemployed population which is more skewed towards the young, and to 
men, than the EU average (the inactive population has a similar age and sex 
distribution to the EU average), although this partly reflects the population 
structure of the UK; 
•  seen, over time, an increasing fraction of the unemployed and inactive com-
posed of young men, and a corresponding shift away from prime-aged women 
(especially amongst the inactive), reflecting the rise in employment amongst 
mothers;  
•  like the EU average, the most recent trend (as the recession hit in 2008) is for an 
increasing share of the unemployed to be men; younger and older women are 
also increasing their share of the inactive population; 
•  non-employment rates in the UK are substantially below the EU average at all 
ages. Since 1990, non-employment rates have fallen for older working age indi-
viduals for men and women; in the EU, they have fallen mostly for women. In 
the current recession, the non-employment rates for older men have risen, but 
have continued to fall for older women;  
•  amongst the working-age population, the unemployed and, to a lesser extent, 
the inactive, are more likely than the employed to be born outside the EU, but 
not by as dramatic an extent as in some EU countries. But, as with other EU 
countries, the differences are more pronounced amongst the 25-49 group: for 
this group, men born outside the EU have a slightly lower employment rate than 
UK-born, but women born outside the EU have a much lower employment rate 
(and much higher inactivity rate) than UK-born women (although not shown in 
this data, this is particularly the case among women, usually Muslim, living in 
couples who are Pakistani or Bangladeshi: see, for example, Clark and Drink-
water (2007)). Trends over time look similar to the EU average; IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  5 
•  the reasons men give for not working are much more likely to be for illness or 
disability, retirement (or “other”) and much less likely to be because of educa-
tion or training, than the EU average. The reasons women give for not working 
are much more likely to be for retirement (or “other”) and much less likely to be 
because for family reasons, or for education or training, than the EU average. 
Amongst those aged 25-49, men and women were more likely to say that they 
were not working because of illness or disability than the EU average. A very 
high proportion of older women (55 to 64) say that they are not working be-
cause of retirement, no doubt because the retirement age for women is currently 
60;
1
•  the proportion of GDP spent on “employment-sensitive functions” in the UK is 
very close to the EU average, with more spent on housing and disability, but 
less spent on unemployment: this presumably reflects the very large caseload 
receiving Employment and Support Allowance and Incapacity Benefit compared 
with Jobseekers Allowance, and the importance of Housing Benefit and Council 
Tax Benefit, discussed further in Section 2.2. 
 
2.2  “Income support systems” in the UK 
2.2.1  Overview 
The UK’s approach to social insurance as typically characterised as “basic security”, 
with relatively modest benefits, typically flat-rate (unrelated to previous earnings) or 
earnings-related but with low income/earnings ceilings. This approach can largely be 
traced back to a period of retrenchment in the 1980s, which cut back earnings-related 
social insurance benefits, up-rated social insurance benefits more slowly (in line with a 
price index rather than the greater of growth in prices or earnings), and taxed some in-
surance-based benefits. Social partners play very little role in the design or administra-
tion of social insurance, social assistance or labour market programmes for the unem-
ployed. Within Great Britain, the national government is responsible for the design of 
                                                 
1 It is rising from 60 to 65 between 2010 and 2020. The Government plans to increase retirement ages for men and 
women to 66 between 2024 and 2026, and the main opposition party has proposed bringing forward the start of this 
rise to 2016 for men and 2020 for women. 6  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation? 
all income support programmes; Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit are adminis-
tered by local government, but they have almost no discretion over the rules, and most 
of the funding for the benefits comes from central government. Social security benefits 
are a devolved matter in Northern Ireland.  
A common distinction to make is between income-replacement benefits, and extra-
cost benefits. The income-replacement benefits, which are the main focus of this paper, 
are those which are intended to provide an income to people who cannot, or who are not 
expected to, work. Extra-cost benefits are paid to people who are considered to have 
higher needs.  
2.2.2  Detail 
A traditional way to think about income support systems is first to consider what cover-
age is provided by the social insurance benefits, and then, for those not covered by such 
benefits, to consider what coverage is provided by social assistance benefits (this views 
the social  assistance benefits as “safety net” benefits)  (see  Figure 2.1).  Sometimes, 
these social assistance benefits are administered and funded by local or municipal gov-
ernments. 
This approach is not particularly helpful for the current set of benefits in the UK. In-
stead, one can think of the UK benefit system as categorising claimants according to the 
reason they are in such a position: this determines which benefit (from a list of four, 
discussed below) an individual might be entitled to. Having established this, one calcu-
lates the level of entitlement to this benefit; this will depend, in general, upon any or all 
of the following: work history, the level of past National Insurance contributions, and 
the circumstances of the claimant and his or her partner (see Figure 2.2). Furthermore, 
as already mentioned, there is no real split between national and local government be-
cause the design and funding of all income support programmes is a matter for the na-
tional UK government. 
   IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  7 
Figure 2.1 Stylized picture of an income support system for those who are unemployed 
or unable to work through sickness or disability with insurance benefits backed up by 
social assistance. 
 
In both Figures, persons A, B and C are unemployed, and persons D and E have a work-
limiting illness or disability. Persons B and D can qualify for insurance benefits, but 
persons A, C and E have to claim social assistance benefits 
 
Figure  2.2  Stylized picture of the UK income support systems for those who are 
unemployed or unable to work through sickness or disability 
 
Figure 2.2 
Of course, the actual situation is more complicated than in Figure 2.1 and 2.2, which 
only considered disability and unemployment as reasons for having no or a low income; 
the other main reason for claiming an income support benefit in the UK is because one 
Unemployment 
insurance benefit 
“Safety-net” social assistance (if satisfy means-test) 
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is caring, either for an adult with disabilities, or a dependent child.
2 A fuller list of the 
income-replacement benefits available to working-age adults with no or low income in 
the UK is (in order of number of recipients):
3
•  Employment and Support Allowance  (ESA) and its predecessor, Incapacity 
Benefit (IB), for those who are unable to work through sickness or disability;
 
4
•  Jobseekers Allowance (JSA), for those who are out of work but required to seek 
work actively as a condition of receiving support; 
  
•  Income Support (IS), for those who are not sick or disabled but are not required 
to seek work actively (mostly full-time carers of children or disabled adults). 
Those aged 60 or over (or with a partner aged 60 or over) may be able to claim 
Pension Credit, which is a more generous form of IS; 
•  Carers’ Allowance (CA), for those who are full-time carers of disabled children 
or adults. 
 
Table 2.1 gives detail on the number of claimants. In general, ESA is the more gener-
ous benefit. A given individual’s entitlement to IS and the means-tested JSA (see be-
low) should generally be identical, and so, as JSA recipients have to be actively seeking 
work, and can lose their entitlement if they do not satisfy various conditions, recipients 
with a choice between IS and JSA should prefer to claim IS. Recipients of ESA, IS and 
CA do not have to look for work as a condition of receiving benefit and can, in prin-
ciple, receive the benefit indefinitely, although recipients of ESA who are deemed not to 
be so disabled that they will never work do have to take steps to manage their health 
condition and attend a series of work focussed interviews.
5
   
 
                                                 
2 In the UK benefit system, children are those aged under 16 or aged 19 or under and in full-time education. 
3 See Annex 2 for some detail on the individual benefits/programmes, and Annex 1 for information on spending and 
recipients (which will help the reader assess the relative importance of the different programmes). 
4 Hereafter we use ESA to refer to ESA and IB, unless stated otherwise. 
5 The Government has proposed abolishing income support and requiring its recipients to claim JSA instead, but 
without imposing job search requirements on these new claimants. As an exercise in reducing the number of distinct 
benefits, this would be a good move, but it would mean that a substantial proportion of recipients of Jobseekers 
Allowance were not jobseekers. A more radical reform would combine these four income-replacement benefits (and 
perhaps others) into one. IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  9 
 
Table 2.1 Working-age claimants of main income-replacement benefits, by statistical 
group. 
  February 2009  February 2008 
Benefits intended for claimants who are not in work 
Job seekers, of which  1,421,600  806,700 
Contributory (ie insurance-
based) 
20%  18% 
Means-tested  80%  82% 
ESA and incapacity benefits  2,693,540  2,617,880 
Contributory(ie insurance-
based) 
54%  55% 
Means-tested  46%  45% 
Lone parent  736,040  741,710 
Carer  400,120  384,490 
Other income related  181,880  169,950 
Benefits which may be paid to workers and non-workers 
Disabled  363,820  349,380 
Bereaved  95,490  104,780 
Note: figures are for Great Britain. The row variables refer to statistical groups created by the DWP, rather than the 
names of benefits. Where a person fits in more than one category, they are assigned to the first in the table, and so the 
totals may be added up without double counting. “Jobseekers” means person receiving JSA, perhaps with other bene-
fits. “ESA and incapacity benefits” means a person receiving ESA, IB, IS on disability grounds, or Severe Disability 
Allowance, perhaps with other benefits. “Lone parent” means a person receiving income support as a lone parent, 
perhaps with CA. “Carer” means a person receiving Carer’s Allowance, perhaps with IS. “Disabled” means a person 
receiving Disability Living Allowance only. “Bereaved” means someone receiving bereavement benefits. Split be-
tween contributory and non-contributory for February 2009 is based on August 2008 data. 
Source: all derived from tables produced using the Department for Work and Pensions’ on-line tabulation tool. Full 
details available from author on request.  
 
The basic entitlement to all of these benefits is unrelated to an individual’s past 
earnings. The only advantage to an individual of having made past National Insurance 
contributions is that the amount of JSA or ESA which is paid is not means-tested 
against other income of that individual nor their partner.  
As suggested by Figure 2.2, ESA and JSA are both insurance-based and means-
tested benefits: adults can become entitled to them either by having made sufficient past 
National Insurance contributions, or if they (and their partner) satisfy the family-level 10  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation? 
means-test. The majority (80% in August 2008) of JSA claimants are receiving the 
means-tested variant, but most (55% in August 2008) recipients of ESA and its prede-
cessor are receiving the insurance-based benefit. In general, the rules surrounding what 
claimants must do to maintain entitlement to the benefit are identical for the contribu-
tions-based and the means-tested benefits, but the amount payable and the duration of 
payment can be different between the two (and it is possible to receive contribution-
based ESA or JSA with an means-tested top-up). Carers Allowance doesn’t follow this 
pattern: it is neither an insurance benefit nor a means-tested benefit (see Annex B for 
more details on who is entitled). The number of people claiming the pure social assis-
tance benefit (Income Support), and who are not also claiming IB (note that this group 
will not exist when existing IB recipients are moved to ESA) is quite low, and is limited 
to those people who are not sick or disabled, and who are not required to work: mostly 
lone parents with young children and those who care for another adult on a full-time ba-
sis.
6
The benefits that have been described above are sometimes known as “income-re-
placement benefits”, because they provide an income to people whose circumstances 
mean that they cannot, or should not be expected to, work. Another set of benefits are 
sometimes known as “extra cost benefits”, which provide additional income to house-
holds who are thought to have higher needs. The main benefits are Child Tax Credit, 
Disability Living Allowance, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit: they are dis-
cussed in Annex B, although the way they affect incentives to work is discussed in the 
next section. 
 
2.2.3  Impact on work incentives 
When thinking about work incentives, a key feature of the four income-replacement 
benefits is that they all place restrictions on the amount of work that can be done by 
their recipients: 
                                                 
6 At the time of writing, the rules on who could claim IS (and therefore did not need to claim JSA) were changing for 
lone parents: in 2007/8, lone parents could claim IS if they had a child under 16; by 2011, lone parents will be able to 
claim IS only if they have a child under 7; there is currently a phase-in period where the age limit is falling in steps 
from 16 to 7. See section 3.1.3. IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  11 
•  ESA recipients are, in general, not allowed to work at all (although earnings of 
£20 a week can be ignored), as the benefit is supposed to be paid only to those 
incapable of working through illness or disability; 
•  JSA and IS recipients may only work up to 15 hours a week, and IS and means-
tested JSA have a 100% withdrawal rate above a very small earnings disregard; 
•  Recipients of CA, who are supposed to be caring for a sick or disabled person 
full-time, may not earn more than £87 a week (which is effectively a “16 hour 
rule” for minimum wage workers), although there is no withdrawal of the bene-
fit for lower levels of earnings.  
These restrictions on the amount of work that can be done lead to substantial “cliff-
edges” in the budget constraint and so, considering these benefits alone, there would be 
very weak incentives (or large dis-incentives) for recipients of these benefits to move 
into paid work, particularly at low hours or low wages. However, the main in-work tax 
credit in the UK, the Working Tax Credit, can in principle offset some or all of the re-
moval of the income-replacement benefits as hours of work increases. The WTC is 
available to: 
•  those with children or disabilities who work 16 or more hours a week; 
•  to non-sick or disabled working-age adults aged 25 or over without children who 
work 30 or more hours a week; 
•  those aged 50 or over, who are returning to work and work at least 16 hours a 
week  
There are therefore gaps in the coverage of WTC: adults under 25 who are not par-
ents and not sick or disabled are never entitled to WTC, and WTC is not available to 
those who are aged 25 or more and working part-time (under 30 hours) unless they are 
parents, or sick or disabled (or aged 50 or over and returning to work). Past work has 
shown that the age cut-off at 25 is vital in containing the cost of WTC, as those under 
25 are particularly likely to have earnings low enough to be entitled to the WTC, but the 
Government has argued that redistribution to this group is not a priority. Annex C illus-
trates the combined impact of the income-replacement benefits and WTC on incentives 
to work (but note that under 25s are not considered). 12  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation? 
Finally, there are two other important means-tested benefits in the UK: the Child Tax 
Credit (CTC), and Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit (considered together as 
HB/CTB).
7
2.3  The financial incentive to work for non-workers in the UK 
 Neither has any form of “hours rules” (whether maximum or minimum 
hours that must/can be worked), and so do not lead to cliff-edges, but both weaken work 
incentives through their withdrawal, like all traditional means-tested benefits. Child Tax 
Credit begins to be withdrawn only at moderate incomes (£16,000 in 2009-10) at a rate 
of 39%; HB/CTB are withdrawn from much lower incomes but at a rate which varies 
across families, and Brewer, Saez and Shephard (forthcoming) identified HB/CTB as 
one of the main contributors to weak work incentives in the UK because of its high 
withdrawal rate, and its poor administration, which can lead to a reluctance amongst 
HB/CTB recipients to enter work.  
Work incentives in the UK were analysed thoroughly as part of the Mirrlees review of 
the tax system, and some results can be found in Brewer, Saez and Shephard (forth-
coming), Adam and Browne (2009) and Adam et al (2006a). 
Annex C updates Brewer et al by showing budget constraints for the primary earner 
in some hypothetical workless families, and those for lone parents are included below.
8
   
  
                                                 
7 Housing Benefit is a rental subsidy programme which can potentially cover the full cost of renting (subject to 
locally-determined rent ceilings), but where  actual entitlement depends upon family income and household 
composition. Council tax benefit is a very similarly structured programme that provides a (potentially 100%) rebate 
on local tax payments (called Council Tax). HB is withdrawn at 65% but against income measured  after income tax, 
national insurance contributions and tax credits; CTB is separately withdrawn at 20% in the same way.  These 
withdrawal rates are cumulative, but they apply to net income, not gross income, and so the 20%/65%/85% 
withdrawal rate of CTB/HB/both combined is not added to the combined income tax-NI-tax credit METR, but instead 
applied to whatever earnings are left. For example, someone facing a combined income tax-employee NICs-tax credit 
METR of 70% and on the taper of both HB and CTB would lose 85% of the remaining 30%, giving a total MTR of 
95.5% (plus 12.8% on the employer side, or 96% overall). Someone with a combined income tax-employee NICs 
METR of 31% and on the taper of CTB would lose 20% of the remaining 69%, giving a total MTR of 44.8% (51% 
with employer NI). 
8 For simplicity, all of the analysis is for the primary earner in a workless family (in other words, any partners are 
assumed not to work) and concentrates on low earnings (£20,000 is below median male full-time earnings in the UK). 
Furthermore, the analysis has assumed all families either rent or have no housing costs (there is means-tested state 
support for those who claim income-based JSA or IS and have a mortgage, and it can lead to a substantial 
disincentive to work, but it is rarely claimed). Brewer et al (forthcoming) analysed the 2008/9 tax and benefit system 
and included the impact of employer’s NI contributions; Annex 3 is of the 2009/10 tax and benefit system, but 
ignores the impact of employer’s NI contributions. IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  13 
 
Figure 2.3 Budget constraints for lone parent without HB, 2009-2010 tax and benefit 
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Figure 2.4 Budget constraints for lone parent with HB/CTB, 2009-2010 tax and benefit 
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Because the budget constraint is substantially different for those with entitlement to 
HB/CTB, analysis has been done with and without entitlement to HB/CTB. 
9 The main 
drawbacks to such analyses are that the figures can be very sensitive to the assumptions 
made, and this type of analysis alone does not show how prevalent or representative are 
the cases which are illustrated. However, they reveal that:
10
•  The  participation tax rate (PTR)
 
11
•  Hours rules are an extremely important part of the benefit system in the UK. 
These hours rules lead to a striking discontinuity in the PTR schedule at 16 
hours work a week (for those with children), and at 30 hours a week when an 
additional credit in the WTC is payable, or when initial eligibility occurs for 
those who are childless. 
  is 0% for very low earnings and  then 
increases rapidly. This reflects the structure of the main means-tested benefits 
for families with no earnings and who work no more than 15 hours a week (JSA 
or IS). For families on JSA/IS, a 100% withdrawal applies after a small earnings 
disregard: families therefore face no direct financial incentive to increase their 
earnings above the very low disregard unless they earn enough to exhaust fully 
entitlement to IS/JSA, or they work sufficiently high number of hours to qualify 
for WTC. 
•  The shape of the budget constraint for low to middle earners, and therefore the 
incentive to do any work, varies considerably by whether a family is entitled to 
HB/CTB).  
The Figures are also informative about METRs for low earners, but these are not dis-
cussed here.  
Annex D draws on Adam and Browne (2009), and presents analysis of the empirical 
distribution of PTRs and RRs. Table D.1, which is new analysis of the same underlying 
                                                 
9 HB in principle covers the full rent of a property, subject to local ceilings (calculated in relatively small areas, 
leading to high rent ceilings in urban areas), and CTB covers the full liability to CT. So an increase in the rent level or 
CT liability increases the amount of benefit for those with no income, and has no effect on those too rich to receive 
HB/CTB, worsening work incentives. This means that the budget constraint depends on the level of rent and of 
council tax; the figures have assumed a relatively low rent. 
10 The rest of this sub-section draws heavily on Brewer, Saez and Shephard (forthcoming).  
11 This measures the extent to which the tax and benefit system erodes the gain to work. It is defined as 1 minus the 
increase in net income when moving into work divided by gross earnings. 16  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation? 
data, estimates the distribution of PTRs amongst non-workers, characterising workers 
by their family-type, and their receipt of out-of-work benefits.
12
•  PTRs are generally higher (weaker incentives to enter work) for families with 
children than those without with identical incomes; 
 Like equivalent analy-
sis in Brewer, Saez and Shephard (forthcoming), it shows that: 
•  PTRs are generally lower for adults whose partner is in work than for the sole 
earner in a couple; 
•  PTRs are higher for those entitled to some form of out-of-work support than for 
those who are not; 
•  The highest PTRs occur amongst lone parents, and amongst adults in couples 
with children where neither are in work. 
 
Box 2.1. Work incentives implied by the UK tax and benefit system 
In a contribution to the Mirrlees review of the tax system,  Brewer, Saez and Shephard 
(forthcoming) identified the following as the main defects in the UK tax and benefit 
system, having reviewed the structure of work incentives implied by the UK tax and 
benefit system, and having reviewed what is known about labour supply elasticities: 
•  “Participation tax rates for low levels of earnings are high: for most groups, 
they are close to 100% before individuals are entitled to the working tax 
credit, and they remain high even with the working tax credit. These PTRs 
appear much too high in a context where optimal tax theory suggests that the 
participation tax rate should be low, possibly even negative, at low levels of 
earnings, so as to encourage people to move into work. And PTRs for fami-
lies potentially entitled to HB/CTB remain extremely high (over 70%) even at 
medium and high incomes. 
•  The phasing-out of the working and child tax credit, which operates on top of 
income tax and NICs, generates METRs of 73.4% including employer NICs 
(higher if also entitled to HB/CTB) for a large number of low to moderate 
                                                 
12 The PTRs include the impact of employer NI and consumption taxes, which may help explain why they appear 
rather high. IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  17 
earners; such a high METR is highly likely to be above the optimum rate 
even with modest behavioural responses. 
•  The main means-tested programme to help with housing (housing benefit) 
has an extremely high withdrawal rate, administrative difficulties and prob-
lems of mis-perception which deter low-income working families from 
claiming it (Turley and Thomas, 2006), and, by its design, predominately af-
fects a minority group in society - tenants of social housing - who we might 
expect to have low earnings capabilities, a weak labour market attachment, 
and therefore relatively high labour supply elasticities. 
•  While the system for administering income tax and NICs in the UK is simple 
and efficient, the systems for administering child and working tax credits, and 
those for housing benefit and council tax benefit, are administratively burden-
some for claimants, relatively expensive for the government, and prone to 
large amounts of fraud and error: all mean that neither is as well-targeted on 
the economic situation of beneficiaries as they could be.” 
 
 
Where incentives to work are weak, it is generally due to one of the following: 
•  the so-called “hours rules” that exist in most benefits payable to those who are 
out-of-work: these remove entitlement to benefits altogether once a person is 
working more than a given number of hours a week (usually 16): these will 
clearly provide a substantial disincentive to work if their impact is not offset by 
the Working Tax Credit (WTC). 
•  Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit have a very steep withdrawal rate, and 
relatively poor administration. 
•  The withdrawal of WTC and CTC, which particularly affects incentives to work 
for (potential) second earners in couples with children. 
However, the relatively low levels of benefits paid to those who are out of work 
means that, in general, RRs and PTRs for non-workers are, therefore, lower than in 18  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation? 
some EU countries.
13
3  Recent reforms in the UK 
 (Box 4.1 summarises the conclusions from a recent analysis of 
work incentives in the UK). 
In this section, we present an overview of reforms to income support programmes since 
1997.
14
Section 3.1 discusses reforms which increase the requirements placed upon recipients 
of out-of-work benefits (i.e. reforms which require more job search or more activities 
preparing for work, or reforms designed to divert people from the out-of-work benefits 
with few requirements to the  out-of-work benefits with rather more requirements). The 
intention was to increase off-flow rates from benefits). The reforms are: 
 We present them in two sections: 
•  The New Deal programme (1997 onwards); 
•  Flexible New Deal, a reform to Jobseekers Allowance (phased in from October 
2009); 
•  Reforms to disability benefits (the Pathways to Work pilot, and the replacement 
of IB with ESA in 2008); 
•  Change affecting lone parents (Work Focused Interviews for lone parents receiv-
ing Income Support (phased in from 2001), and the removal of entitlement to In-
come Support for lone parents with children aged 7 or over (phased in between 
2008-2011). 
Section 3.2 discusses the main reforms which have attempted to strengthen the finan-
cial incentive for those receiving out-of-work benefits to move into work. Note that the 
more important of these do NOT involve reforms to the income support programmes: 
instead, they involve reforms to the in-work tax credits, or similar programmes. These 
are  
•  Replacing Family Credit with the Working Families’ Tax Credit (phased in be-
tween 1999 and 2000) 
                                                 
13 OECD (2009) shows that the total tax wedge on a single adult at average earnings is below the OECD average, but 
that for a sole earner in a married couple with two children it is above the OECD average. 
14 This choice of date makes political sense, as it was, at the time of writing (2009) the last time there was a change in 
government in the UK. IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  19 
•  Introduction of the Working Tax Credit for those without children (2003) 
•  Higher earnings disregards in HB/CTB for families with children (2008) 
•  Various targeted and time-limited in-work incentive programmes (the Return to 
Work Credit for older workers, In Work Credit for lone parents (2004 onwards), 
and another Return to Work Credit piloted as part of Pathways to Work (since 
2003, and nationwide from 2008). 
3.1  Reforms to increase the requirements placed upon recipients of 
out-of-work benefits 
3.1.1  The New Deal programme 
The centrepiece of the Labour Government’s welfare to work reforms in its first few 
years was the New Deal. There are a number of New Deals aimed at different groups on 
welfare, each with differing eligibility requirements and varying degrees of compulsion, 
but the New Deal generally represents a strengthening of the requirements applicable to 
recipients of Jobseekers Allowance.
15
The New Deal for Young People (NDYP) was introduced across the UK in April 
1998; before this time, there was no specific programme for young unemployed people, 
only for the long-term unemployed. Participation in NDYP is compulsory for all young 
people aged between 18 and 24 who have been claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) 
for at least six months, and involves up to four months of extensive assistance with job 
search from a personal advisor. If participants have not found employment by the end of 
this ‘gateway’ period, then they are offered up to four options, all of which seek to im-
prove their employability (these are: subsidised job placement with training. Education, 
voluntary or environmental work). By the end of 2004, 38 per cent of participants left 
for sustained unsubsidised jobs, 11 per cent transferred to other benefits, 20 per cent 
have left for other known reasons, and the remaining 31 per cent for unknown reasons 
(section 4 discusses an evaluation of the impact of NDYP).  
 
The national New Deal 25 Plus programme (ND25+) was originally launched in July 
1998 and reformed in April 2001. The programme focuses upon the long-term unem-
ployed, with mandatory participation for all individuals who have been claiming JSA 
                                                 
15 See, for example, DWP (2008a) for more detail. 20  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation? 
for 18 of the last 21 months. The programme now shares common features with the 
NDYP, beginning with an initial ‘gateway’ period lasting for up to four months, fol-
lowed by an ‘Intensive Activity Period’ typically lasting for no more than 26 weeks, 
which  includes flexible packages of support which  can combine work experi-
ence/placements, work focused training and help with motivation and soft skills.  
There are also a number of voluntary New Deal programmes open to different groups 
of the inactive or unemployed (New Deal for Lone Parents, New Deal for Disabled 
People, New Deal for 50 plus and New Deal for Partners). Participants in the pro-
gramme are assigned a personal advisor, who generally assists with a range of job 
search activities. Because the programmes are voluntary, they offer only additional sup-
port, with no threat of sanctions in the case of non-compliance. 
The New Deals are in the process of being replaced with something called the flexi-
ble New Deal (FND).
16 Under FND, all JSA claimants will face the same conditions, 
which will involve intensified job-search activity in months 6-12 of a claim of JSA, and 
then a referral to an external provider for specialist help and advice if a claim reaches 12 
months (DWP, 2007).
17
3.1.2  Reforms to disability benefits 
 FND began in parts of Great Britain in October 2008.  
Since October 2003, the UK Government has been piloting reforms which both provide 
greater support (financial and non-financial) and impose greater obligations to encour-
age claimants of incapacity benefits to move into paid work. These were known as the 
‘Pathways to Work’ reforms, and they led to the replacement of IB with ESA in 2008 
(initially only for new claimants).  
Like other OECD countries, the numbers of individuals claiming incapacity benefits 
have risen considerably in recent years, more than trebling in GB over the last quarter of 
a century. Moreover, as shown in Figure 3.1, despite the replacement in April 1995 of 
Invalidity Benefit with Incapacity Benefit – which was designed to have a more strin-
                                                 
16 It started in parts of Great Britain (GB) in October 2009, and will be nationwide from October 2010. 
17 The Government has also proposed testing a Community Work Programme for those who are still unemployed 
after the 12 months with an external provider, although this pilot is not due to start before the next general election. 
The Government has also proposed testing, from March 2011, a new employment programme which would include 
both those on unemployment (JSA) and disability (ESA) benefits (ie it would combine FND and Pathways to Work). 
See (DWP, 2008b) for details on both.  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  21 
gent health test – the number of claimants of these benefits aged under the State Pension 
Age has continued to grow between 1995 and the mid-2000s, albeit at a slower rate than 
over the previous ten years, chiefly because of a sharp rise in female claimants. 
 Figure 3.1 Number of claimants of Invalidity and Incapacity Benefit aged under 






Source: based on data available from http://www.erini.ac.uk/dsp_sub.cfm/Page/IBGrowth/Parent/. See also 
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Many individuals receiving Incapacity Benefit do so for a long time. When introducing 
the pilots, the Government estimated that those claiming the benefit for more than 
twelve months end up claiming for eight years. The reforms piloted were motivated by 
concerns that the existing arrangement – which placed no requirements on recipients to 
look for work – did not do enough to encourage claimants back into paid work (a de-
tailed discussion can be found in the Green Paper which proposed the pilots: DWP, 
2002). The Pathways to Work package of reforms for new claimants of incapacity bene-
fits included three aspects: mandatory monthly work-focused interviews for the first six 
months (those with particularly serious medical conditions are exempted), a set of 
health-related and labour market programmes, and increased financial support and in-
centives, with a  new and generous Return to Work Credit paying £40 a week for the 
first year of paid employment after leaving incapacity benefits if gross annual earnings 
are below £15,000. 
Pathways to Work was rolled out nationwide in 2008 (it is compulsory for new 
claimants and existing claimants aged under 25, optional for other existing ones). At the 
same time, Incapacity Benefit was replaced by Employment and Support Allowance 
(ESA), initially for new claimants. They key differences between ESA and IB are: 
•  ESA is available as a contributory or a means-tested benefit. Under the previous 
regime, people who had no private income because of disability or poor health 
were split between two benefits, claiming IB if they had made past National In-
surance contributions, and IS if they had not. This change to ESA  means that all 
adults claiming an income support programme because of disability or poor 
health will be receiving (when the reform is fully phased in) the same benefit 
(ESA), rather than split across two. This clearly makes the benefit system sim-
pler. 
•  The generosity of ESA is no greater than JSA for the first 13 weeks. After, it is 
more generous than JSA only if a person has a serious health condition, or par-
ticipates in work-related activities. IB, by contrast, placed no requirements on 
recipients to do anything related to work, and was always more generous than 
JSA. IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  23 
•  The medical test for ESA (called the Work Capability Test), assesses what peo-
ple can do, rather than what they cannot do. The Government expected that 
fewer people taking the test would go on to qualify for ESA than was the case 
for IB.  
•  ESA recipients will have their health re-assessed every two years. 
As discussed earlier, only new claimants are currently affected by the ESA reform, 
although the Government has said that it will make all existing IB recipients move to 
ESA between 2010 and 2013 (a process which, if carried through, will require them to 
participate in the new, tougher, health assessment).  
3.1.3  Changes affecting lone parents 
The treatment of lone parents within the UK’s income support programmes deserves 
attention for a number of reasons. First, the UK has internationally high proportions of 
families with children headed by a lone parent (23% of children live in a lone parent 
family: see ONS (2009)). Second, lone parents tend to have relatively poor skills, and 
those in paid work tend to work part-time for relatively low wages, and so whether 
working or not, they make up a significant proportion of the group likely to be affected 
by welfare or tax credit reforms. Third, until recently, the UK had relatively generous 
rules for lone parents who claim welfare benefits: before 2008, lone parents who satis-
fied the mean-test were allowed to claim Income Support, rather than Jobseekers Allow-
ance, and thereby excused from any job-search requirements until their youngest child 
reached 16. No doubt reflecting these points, fewer than half of lone parents were in 
work in 1997, and relative poverty rates for children in lone parent families were much 
higher than children in couple families.
18
The first reforms directly affecting lone parents receiving Income Support were to 
require them to meet at least annually with a personal adviser (case worker), whose 
main aim was to promote the New Deal for Lone Parents, in what was called a Work 
Focused Interview.
    
19
                                                 
18 See Brewer, Muriel, Phillips and Sibieta (2009). 
 But a much more dramatic change is currently being phased in, 
whereby lone parents with no children aged under 7 with no or low private income will, 
19 This requirement was fully phased in by 2006. Many of the changes to tax credits, minimum wage, and childcare 
policies (described in Brewer (2007)) have been of particular help to lone parents. 24  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation? 
by 2011, not be entitled to claim IS as a lone parent, and will instead have to claim ESA 
(if disabled) or JSA (if not).
20
3.2  Reforms to strengthen the financial incentive for those receiving 
out-of-work benefits to move into work.  
  
This section discusses the main reforms which have attempted to strengthen the finan-
cial incentive for those receiving out-of-work benefits to move into work. Note that the 
more important of these do NOT involve reforms to the income support programmes: 
instead, they involve reforms to the in-work tax credits, or similar programmes. 
3.2.1  Replacing Family Credit with the Working Families’ Tax Credit  
In October 1999, an in-work benefit programme called Family Credit (FC) was replaced 
with one called Working Families’ Tax Credit, motivated by concerns to improve the 
incentives for low-earning parents to be in paid work. In the jargon, WFTC was a ‘re-
fundable’ tax credit, i.e. payable even if it exceeded the family’s income tax liability. To 
be entitled, at least one adult in a family with children must work at least 16 hours a 
week. There is a basic credit for each family plus additions for each child, and this is 
withdrawn once earnings exceed a disregard. The phase-out or withdrawal rate in 
WFTC was 55%, but this applies to earnings after income tax and social insurance have 
been deducted, so the usual overall marginal deduction rate for someone receiving 
WFTC was 69%.
21
In operational terms, there was little difference between WFTC and its predecessor: 
for example, WFTC was still subject to strict capital rules, like all welfare benefits in 
the UK. Some operational differences, though, were that WFTC was administered by 
the tax authority (not the agency responsible for social security benefits), and that, ex-
cept where couples with children requested it to be paid to a non-working adult, it was 
paid to individuals by employers.   
   
However, the more important difference with FC was that WFTC was substantially 
more generous, with a higher earnings disregard, a lower withdrawal rate, more gener-
                                                 
20 See, for example, chapter 2 of DWP (2007) for final details of the plans. Some lone parents will be entitled to claim 
IS even with older children if they have another reason for being entitled (such as being a carer). 
21  The equivalent marginal deduction rate for someone receiving tax credits, paying income tax and national 
insurance is now 70%. IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  25 
ous entitlements, and a subsidy for childcare expenditures.  Overall, these changes sub-
stantially increased in-work incomes for eligible families, and the number of eligible 
families, and the WFTC was approximately twice as expensive as its immediate prede-
cessor: Figure 3.2 shows that expenditure on employment tax credits almost doubled 
between 1998–99 and 2000–01, going from £2.68 billion to £4.81 billion in constant 
2002 prices. There was a further substantial increase by 2002, to £6.46 billion.  
 
Figure 3.2 Expenditure in-work programmes in Great Britain, 1991/2 – 2002/3 
 
DPTC – disabled person’s tax credit. DWA – disability working allowance. 
Note: WFTC replaced FC in October 1999, so there was expenditure on both of them during the 1999–2000 tax year.  
Source: taken from Brewer and Browne (2006), based on various sources. 
3.2.2  Introduction of the Working Tax Credit for those without children  
Tax credits were further reformed in 2003 with the introduction of child tax credit 
(CTC) and working tax credit (WTC), in what was the biggest change in support for 
children since the introduction of child benefit in 1977. The CTC merged together sev-
eral parts of the tax and benefit system that supported families with children, and WTC 
extended in-work support to adults without children. This was the first time that addi-
tional support had been offered to non-disabled families without children who were in 
work but on a low income.  
The WTC is less generous than it is for families with children: those without children 
have to be aged 25 or over, to work full-time (unless disabled or returning to work and 
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without children working a standard 37.5 hour week would need an hourly wage of be-
low £6.80 – i.e., no greater than 17% higher than the national minimum wage – to qual-
ify in the current financial year). Around 330,000 families without children receive the 
working tax credit, with most beneficiaries being fairly old: 62% are aged 40 or over, 
and 32% are aged 50 or over.
22 Take-up (programme participation), however, is ex-
tremely low by UK standards, at around 1 in 5.
23 The most common stated reason for 
not claiming was that potential recipients were not aware that they were eligible, per-
haps because tax credits for working adults without children are still novel, and infor-
mation and awareness about them still low.
24
3.2.3  Various targeted and time-limited in-work incentive programmes 
 
A feature of welfare to work reforms in the UK in recent years has been the use of time-
limited, targeted, back-to-work incentive payments. The key features are: 
•  Recipients have to be in work  
•  Recipients have to have previously been receiving an out-of-work benefit 
•  The payment is only made for a limited period of time (usually a year). 
The particular schemes include: 
•  A 12-month supplement to the WTC for those aged  50 or over who have left an 
out-of-work benefit and moved into work of at least 16 hours/week. It increases 
WTC entitlement by up to £37 a week. 
•  The Return to Work credit, which is payable for up to 12 months to people who 
have left ESA or IB to move directly into work of at least 16 hours/week and 
whose earnings do not exceed £15,000 a year. It is worth £40/week. 
•  The In Work Credit, which is payable for up to 12 months to lone parents who 
have left an out-of-work benefit to move into work of at least 16 hours/week. It 
is worth £40/week (£60/week in London). 
The Return to Work credit and In Work Credit were initially piloted in parts of the 
country, but all are now available nationwide. 
                                                 
22 HMRC (2009a), 
23  Or 1 in 4 on an expenditure basis: see HMRC (2009b). 
24 See McAlpine and Thomas (2008).  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  27 
3.2.4  Higher earnings disregards in Housing Benefit/Council Tax Benefit for 
families with children (2008) 
In 2008, a change was made to HB/CTB which effectively increased the amount of 
earnings that are disregarded for families with children when calculating entitlement to 
HB/CTB if they work 16 or more hours. This reform therefore strengthens the incentive 
for the primary earner in a family with children to work in jobs of 16 or more hours. 
The downside is that it increases the range of earnings over which a high METR ap-
plies. This is similar to a reform suggested in Bell et al (2007). 
3.3  Reforms to benefits and welfare programmes to reduce the impact 
of the financial crisis/recession 
As well as an increase in the funding available to Jobcentre Plus, there are two specific 
welfare-to-work measures that have been introduced as the result of the recession: 
•  the Future Jobs Fund 
•  Job guarantee for young people (“Young Person’s Guarantee”). 
The Young Person’s Guarantee is that, from January 2010, all under 24s who have 
been unemployed for a year will have the chance of a job (possibly through the Future 
Jobs Fund), work-focused training or a work experience placement in something called 
the Community Task Force. From March 2010, this will become a condition of receipt 
of benefit. This is basically an acceleration of something which should happen anyway 
under the New Deal for Young People, but will now happen after only 12 months of un-
employment. 
The Future Jobs Fund aims to provide 100,000 new jobs for young people, and 
50,000 in areas of high unemployment. Any employer – private, public or voluntary 
sector – can bid for government funds (up to £6,500 per job) to subsidise the creation of 
new jobs. The jobs have to pay at least national minimum wage, be full-time, last at 
least six months, and of benefit to the local community. Additionally, employers have to 
show that the jobs would not have happened without the Future Jobs Fund. 28  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation? 
4  The effects of the reforms 
4.1  New Deal for Young People (NDYP)
25
Three studies have looked in detail at the NDYP: Blundell et al (2004) looked at the 
programme in its early days, and De Giorgi (2005a,b) examined whether the early im-
pacts were stable over later cohorts.  
 
Blundell et al (2004) looked at the job assistance and wage subsidy element of the 
New Deal by examining flows off unemployment to jobs during the first four months of 
treatment (the “Gateway” period). They present a number of difference-in-differences 
(DiD) estimators making use of two sources of differential eligibility. First, they look at 
the first areas to pilot the NDYP, where they are able to use young adults in similar 
areas not operating NDYP as a control group. Second, they look at a time when the pro-
gramme ran nationally, and use slightly older (and therefore ineligible) adults as a con-
trol group.  
They conclude that the outflow rate to jobs has risen by about 20 per cent for young 
men as a result of the New Deal during its National Roll Out (i.e. five percentage points 
more men find jobs in the first four months of the New Deal above a pre-program level 
of twenty five percentage points).
26
The idea of using older, ineligible, adults as a control group was exploited further in 
De Giorgi (2005a), who estimates a local average treatment effect (LATE) using a non-
parametric regression discontinuity. De Giorgi is also able to look at outcomes after a 
longer period of time (i.e. up to 12 months after starting the gateway, rather than 4 
months) and for a series of different cohorts. Reassuringly, the study also finds that the 
NDYP increases the proportion of unemployed men in work by about 6-7%, and that 
this impact is relatively stable over time.
  The results are very similar when using older, 
ineligible, adults as the comparison group. This suggests that either equilibrium wage 
and substitution effects are not very strong or they broadly cancel each other out. 
27
                                                 
25 This draws on Brewer (2007). 
  
26 Women make up around 1 in 4 participants on NDYP; Blundell et al (2004) reports that the estimated impacts on 
women were smaller, less precisely estimated, and not robust to the choice of control group. 
27 NAO (2007) reviews the performance of the New Deals, and estimates that many run at a net cost to the Exchequer 
(ie the programme costs outweigh the savings from getting people into work faster), but it makes no attempt to do a 
social cost benefit analysis.  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  29 
4.2  Pathways to work
28
As is common with reforms piloted by the Department for Work and Pensions, the 
Pathways to Work policies were first introduced in a number of areas. As with the pilots 
of the NDYP, this naturally suggests a DiD evaluation, using claimants of incapacity 
benefit in non-pilot areas as a control group. 
 
Figure 4.1 applies this concept to administrative data, and shows that flows off inca-
pacity benefit in the pilot areas were around 8 percentage points higher in the six 





Figure 4.1 Six-months off-flow rate from incapacity benefits, by whether or not subject 
to the Pathways to Work pilots in October 2003 (Phase 1) or April 2004 (Phase 2). 
 
Source:  Blyth (2006). 
 
In a more formal evaluation, Table 4.1 shows DiD estimates of the outcomes of 
interest in the Phase 1 and Phase 2 pilots for those who made an enquiry about claiming 
incapacity benefits (having taking into account background characteristics, time since 
the enquiry and broad area of residence). 
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The first column shows the early impact of the Pathways to Work pilots on the like-
lihood of being in paid work in the week before to the second wave interview (which is 
on average around 10½ months after the individual made the initial enquiry about 
claiming incapacity benefits). It shows that the early impact of the Pathways to Work 
policy was to increase the percentage of individuals doing paid work at that time by 9.4 
percentage points. To place this in context, just under one-third (31.9%) of those in the 
pilot areas in the period after the pilots had been implemented reported that they had 
been in paid work in the previous week, so the estimated impact suggests that in the ab-
sence of these pilots the employment rate in the last week would have been just 22.5% 
(i.e. 31.9–9.4). 
Table 4.1 Difference-in-differences estimates of the early impact, all who made enquiry 
about claiming incapacity benefits 










  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 











         
Sample size  7,861  7,861  7,861  7,861 
Adjusted R^2  14.9%  13.8%  11.0%  34.2% 
         
Note: Unweighted. Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes that the coefficient is statistically different from zero 
at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Other variables controlled for include days since initial en-
quiry into claiming IB, broad area of residence, and a set of demographic variables, education level and initial health 
condition. 
Source: Derived from tables in chapter 4 of Adam et al (2006b) 
 
The estimates also suggest that the early effects of the pilots were to increase 
monthly earnings (by £71.73, or over a quarter of total earnings in the pilot areas), re-
duce the likelihood that an individual was claiming incapacity benefit by 8 percentage 
points, and reduce the percentage of respondents reporting that their health limited their 
daily activities. The pilots seem to have been more successful at helping older workers, 
and those who did not claim to have mental health problems. Subsequent evaluations 
continued to report positive findings, with a report on longer-term outcomes concluding 
that “Pathways significantly increased the probability of being employed about a year IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  31 
and a half after the initial incapacity benefits enquiry by 7.4 percentage points”, and a 
cost-benefit analysis concluding that “Overall, the financial benefits of Pathways that 
we estimated significantly exceed the estimated financial costs, with net measured bene-
fits both to Pathways participants and to the Exchequer”.
30
4.3  Reforms to in-work benefits and credits
 
31
4.3.1  Working Families’ Tax Credit 
 
As one of the highest-profile changes to be made early on by the present UK Govern-
ment, WFTC has been evaluated in a number of studies, and these are summarised in 
Brewer and Browne (2006) (hereafter, BB). BB compared a number of studies that had 
treated the introduction of WFTC as a natural experiment, with one that used a struc-
tural model of labour supply to simulate ex post the impact of WFTC compared with its 
predecessor. In general, the results from both sets of studies are reassuringly similar 
(this can also be viewed as a validation of the structural model). 
Those studies that treated the introduction of WFTC as a natural experiment used 
DiD to estimate the impact of WFTC on the employment of families with children, 
making use of families without children as a control group. The raw data underlying this 
is shown in Figure 4.2: there is a clear convergence in the employment rate of lone par-
ents with single adults without children which would suggest a positive employment ef-
fect of WFTC.
32
                                                 
30 See Bewley et al (2007) and Adam et al (2008). 
 
31 This draws on Brewer (2007). 
32 In fact, the convergence starts some time before October 1999, and the various studies reviewed by Brewer and 
Browne (2006) have different ways of accounting for this. 32  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation? 
Figure 4.2 Employment rates of single adults by parental status, 1997 – 2004. 
 
Notes: Not seasonally adjusted. The employment rate is calculated as the percentage of the population of working age 
(16–59 for women and 16–64 for men) who are in employment (working at least one hour in the reference week or 
temporarily away from a job). 
Source: Brewer and Shephard (2005), based on Labour Force Survey data, various years. 
 
One limitation of the DiD approach is that it cannot evaluate the impact of WFTC 
alone on labour market behaviour of families with children, because WFTC was intro-
duced around the same time as other tax and benefit reforms that affected families with 
children (see Brewer et al, 2006 or BB for details). Technically, those studies using DiD 
are evaluating the impact of all changes to the economic and policy environment that af-
fected families with children differently from families without children: the most im-
portant of these other than WFTC was an increase in welfare benefits for families with 
children.  
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 illustrate this by showing the impact of tax and benefit 
changes between April 1999 and April 2002 (i.e. comparing the situation just before 
WFTC was introduced to just before CTC and WTC replaced it) on the budget con-
straints faced by a lone parent and by a mother in a couple respectively, both with two 
children aged under 5 and earning the 2002 minimum wage. Figure 4.3 makes clear that 
the income available to a lone parent who was not working increased substantially over 
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lone parent. Figure 4.4 shows that the income available to the family when the second 
earner does not work increased substantially, but the income available to the family 
when both adults worked increased by much less, consistent with a higher PTR. 
Figure 4.3 Change in the budget constraint for a lone parent with two children under 5, 
April 1999 to April 2002 
 
Note: Assumes hourly wage of £4.10, no housing costs or council tax liability, no entitlement to child support and no 
childcare costs.  
 
Figure 4.4 Change in the budget constraint for mother in couple with two children 
under 5, April 1999 to April 2002 
 
Notes: Assumes hourly wage of £4.10, no housing costs or council tax liability and no childcare costs. The first 
earner in the couple is assumed to earn £300 per week in 2002 prices. 
 
A structural model of labour supply tries to relate directly choices of whether and 
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and more slowly withdrawn than its predecessor, so economic theory predicts different 
impacts on different groups of parents. In particular, the increase in generosity would: 
•  for adults in workless families, lead to a stronger incentive to work 16 or more 
hours per week. We would therefore expect some currently workless families to 
participate as a result of this reform, and also some parents currently working 
less than 16 hours per week to move over the threshold.  
•  lead to a reduction in the number of two-worker families, when two-worker 
families found they needed to work a little less hard in order to achieve their pre-
reform standard of living (an income effect away from work).  
The lower withdrawal rate would also have different effects on adults in different fami-
lies depending on their income: 
•  For those previously claiming FC, there would be an increase in the return to an 
extra hour’s work as a result of the lower withdrawal rate, leading to an increase 
in the number of hours worked (a substitution effect towards work).  
•  On the other hand, those who previously earned too much to claim FC but who 
were now eligible for WFTC would experience a substitution effect away from 
work. 
Table 4.2 shows the results of the simulations of WFTC alone on lone parents: em-
ployment is predicted to rise by 5.1 ppts (from 49.6 %), and mean hours worked in-
creases amongst workers (because the lower withdrawal rate increased incomes the 
most where the taper previously ended, usually corresponding to full-time work). Much 
of this shift seems to have been into full-time work, and there also seems to have been a 
considerable shift among lone mothers from part-time to full-time work. However, the 
reforms implemented at the same time as the WFTC acted to reduce employment 
amongst lone parents, and a simulation of the set of changes actually introduced be-
tween 1999 and 2002 (not shown here) suggests that tax and benefit changes increased 
lone parent employment by 3.7 ppts. 
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Table 4.2 The estimated impact of WFTC on lone mothers’ labour supply 
    After WFTC       
    Not working  Part-time  Full-time  Total 
Before WFTC  Not working  49.6  2.4  2.8  54.7 
  Part-time  0.00  22.4  1.1  23.5 
  Full-time  0.0  0.41  21.4  21.8 
  Total  49.6  25.2  25.2  100.0 
Change in employment rate        5.1 (0.68) 
Average change in weekly hours 
(all) 
      1.78 (0.21) 
Average change in weekly hours 
(workers) 
      0.75 (0.05) 
Average hours before WFTC (all)        12.42 (0.20) 
Average hours before WFTC 
(workers) 
      27.4 (0.16) 
Notes: based on Table 4 in Brewer et al (2006). Estimated standard deviations given in brackets.  
 
Estimate of the overall impact on employment are given in Table 4.3: although the im-
pact of WFTC on lone parents employment is relatively high, the impact on adults in 
couples with children is broadly neutral, and those reforms implemented at the same 
time as WFTC acted to reduce labour supply. The combined effect of 22,000 workers 
corresponds to less than 0.1 ppt of the total workforce. 
Table 4.3 The Estimated Impact of WFTC on total employment 







WFTC  75,000  -21,000  27,000  81,000 
WFTC and contemporaneous 
reforms 
55,000  -18,000  -15,000  22,000 
Notes: based on Table 4 in Brewer et al (2006).  
 
4.3.2  Working Tax Credit for those without children 
The only evaluation of the introduction of the working tax credit for those without chil-
dren was undertaken by two economists at HM Treasury, and published as HM Treas-
ury (2008). It compares the probability of employment of low-educated 25-27 year-olds 
with 22-24 year olds, and how this changes when the WTC is introduced. The paper 
presents evidence that the probability of employment of the affected group did indeed 
rise shortly after the introduction of WTC relative to the younger adults, by between 2 36  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation? 
and 3 ppts, depending on the specification. However, the number of 25-29 year olds 
actually in receipt of WTC in this period was extremely low, and the estimated impact 
of WTC implies that the majority of them would not have worked in the absence of 
WTC: this seems a very high responsiveness (or, equivalently, a very low deadweight) 
for an in-work benefit, and might suggest that the estimated impact is partly capturing 
contemporaneous changes in the labour market or welfare system.  Furthermore, the 
majority of WTC recipients are aged 40 or over, and it is not clear how good a guide the 
estimated impacts for young adults are to the impacts for older individuals. 
4.3.3  Targeted, time-limited in-work benefits and credits 
Chapter 3 discussed the recent use of time-limited, targeted, back-to-work incentive 
payments. A key evaluation question is whether recipients discount such incentives be-
cause they are time-limited, and, if there are any impacts, to what extent they persist af-
ter the payments stop (Card and Hyslop (2005) evaluate the labour market impact of a 
time-limited in-work payment in Canada).  
Only one of these, the In Work Credit for lone parents, has been evaluated thorough-
ly (Brewer et al, 2009).
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5  Summary and conclusions  
 After 12 months exposure, the proportion of lone parents who 
were potentially eligible for IWC (in other words, those who could have received IWC 
had they left benefits and started work) had risen by 1.6 ppts from a base of around 
18%. Amongst IWC recipients, IWC was estimated to increase the proportion who were 
no longer receiving benefit by 29% averaged over the 2 years since first receiving IWC. 
Brewer et al (2009) argue that these impacts are much smaller than for conventional in-
work credits, and at least as large as other welfare to work interventions for lone parents 
in the UK, but a cost-effectiveness calculation has not been carried out. 
•  The UK’s approach to social insurance can be characterised as “basic security”, 
with relatively modest benefits which are typically flat-rate. Most claimants of 
the key unemployment and disability benefits are claiming a means-tested vari-
                                                 
33 The Return to Work credit has been evaluated as part of the Pathways to Work package (see Adam et al (2008)), 
but the evaluation could not separate out the impact of the credit from the other parts of Pathways to Work. IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  37 
ant. Social partners play very little role in the design or administration of social 
insurance or social assistance or labour market programmes for the unemployed. 
Local government has almost no role in the design or funding of benefits. 
•  Compared with the EU average, the UK has relatively high employment rates 
for men and women. The employment gap between men and women, particu-
larly mothers, continues to close. The employment rate of older workers is lower 
than younger workers, but rising over time, and so converging  with that of 
younger workers. A high proportion of non-workers say that they are not work-
ing because of illness or disability. The tax wedge on those on average earnings 
is below the OECD average for single adults, but above it for single-earner mar-
ried couples with two children. 
•  The UK’s system of income-replacement benefits tries to categorise claimants 
according to the reason they are out-of-work and needing state support (sick or 
disabled, jobseeking, caring, other). Whether they have made contributions to 
social insurance in the past is not particularly relevant to their entitlement to 
such benefits or their generosity: the current government has continued the long-
run trend to diminish the role of social insurance by reducing the value of social 
insurance benefits down to that of the means-tested equivalents. 
•  In general, the relatively low generosity of out-of-work benefits means that RRs 
and PTRs remain below 100% for most. However, the income-replacement 
benefits have a negative impact on incentives to work through maximum hours 
rules (”claimants may work no more than X hours/week”), only some of which 
are directly offset by the Working Tax Credit. High withdrawal rates mean that 
weak work incentives also exist for those who rent and are entitled to Housing 
Benefit, and for primary earners in couples who have low earnings. The fact that 
in-work tax credits have increased so much in generosity over the last decade 
means that incentives to work for potential second earners are weaker than they 
used to be. 
•  Most recent reforms to strengthen work incentives have NOT involved changing 
the out-of-work benefits, but instead have altered the in-work benefits or tax 
credits, or lowered income tax and National Insurance liabilities for low earners. 38  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation? 
Such reforms are expensive compared to their impact on employment, and only 
make sense if the Government values their redistributive features. Most reforms 
to the out-of-work benefits have involved increasing the job-search or other re-
quirements placed on claimants, and this has so far applied to the unemployed, 
the sick and disabled, and lone parents with children aged over 7.  
•  The recession has led to changes in welfare-to-work policies for the under 24s, 
with the government aiming to create 100,000 more jobs, and to make it com-
pulsory for young people to undertake training or work experience in commu-
nity projects after a year of unemployment. 
•  The precise future of welfare reform in the UK will depend on which party is in 
power after the election, expected in Spring 2010, but the two main political 
parties are broadly in agreement that the future will involve extending conditions 
placed to other recipients of income-replacement benefits, moving all IB claim-
ants to ESA, a greater use of the private sector, and gradually aligning the labour 
market programmes for the unemployed and disabled.  
•  Key aspects of the UK experience which should be of interest to other EU coun-
tries are: i) the use of in-work tax credits to offset the detrimental impact on 
work incentives of the income-replacement benefits; ii) the way that insurance-
based benefits and social assistance are treated as a single system; iii) the way 
that the number of income-replacement benefits is being (slowly) reduced, and 
the way that the welfare-to-work programmes for different types of claimants of 
income-replacement benefits are (gradually) being  aligned. Remaining chal-
lenges for the UK, in the author’s opinion, include: i) dealing with the very large 
stock of IB recipients, many of whom will not have worked for several years; ii) 
the complexity and poor administration of the in-work tax credits, which reduces 
transparency and thereby dulls their positive impact on work incentives; iii) the 
substantial disincentive to work caused by the structure of and poor administra-
tion of Housing Benefit. 
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Annex A 
This Annex is taken from http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn13.pdf 
 
Table A.1 GB Expenditure and claimant figures for all benefits and tax credits, 2007–
08 
  Expenditure 
(£m)
a 
% of total 
expenditure  Claimants
b 
Benefits for families with children       
Child benefit (including former one-parent 
benefit)  10,650
c  6.74%  7,579,700 
Child Trust Fund  168d  0.11%  Not available 
Child tax credit  13,700
c,
e  8.67%  6,131,000
f 
Statutory maternity pay  1,469  0.93%  Not available
g 
Maternity allowance  247  0.16%  52,400 
Guardian’s allowance  1.9  0.00%  3,400
h   
Education maintenance allowance  567
i  0.35%  610,000
i 
Total benefits for families with children  26,796  16.96%   
 
Benefits for unemployed people        
Income-based jobseeker’s allowance  1,816  1.15%  935,400  
Contribution-based jobseeker’s allowance and 
UB  427  0.27%  378,200  
New Deal programmes (Young Persons and 
25-Plus)  110  0.07%  157,990
e 
Job grant  49  0.03%  Not available 
Total benefits for unemployed people  2,402  1.52%   
 
Benefits for people on low incomes        
Income support  8,948  5.67%  2,045,220 
Working tax credit  5,800
c,e  3.67%  2,261,000  
Housing benefit  15,752  9.97%  4,403,980  
Discretionary housing payments  20  0.01%  122,330
h 
Council tax benefit  4,124  2.61%  5,428,230  
Social Fund payments  419  0.27%  12,035,000 
awards 
Total benefits for people on low incomes  34,954  22.13%   
 
Benefits for elderly people        
Basic retirement pension (contributory)  47,369  29.99%  12,226,260 
Basic retirement pension (non-contributory)  40  0.03%  26,300
o 
Earnings-related retirement pension  10,184  6.45%  Not available 
Pension credit  7,463  4.72%  2,723,610 
Retirement pension – total  65,056  41.19%   
Winter fuel payments  2,071  1.31%  12,123,000  
Concessionary television licences  510  0.32%  3,993,000  
Total benefits for elderly people  67,637  42.82%   
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  Expenditure 
(£m)
a 
% of total 
expenditure  Claimants
b 
Benefits for sick and disabled people 
Statutory sick pay  48  0.03%  Not available 
Incapacity benefit  6,658  4.22%  2,221,890 
Employment and Support Allowance  -
p  -  87,000  
Severe disablement allowance  756  0.48%  243,200  
Disability living allowance  9,867  6.25%  3,043,990 
Attendance allowance  4,444  2.81%  1,578,640 
Carer’s allowance  1,280  0.81%  502,500 
Independent Living Funds  299  0.19%  21,000  
Motability  12  0.01%  500,000 




c  0.64%  190,745  
Total benefits for sick and disabled people  25,316  16.03%   
 
Benefits for bereaved people        
Widows’ and bereavement benefits  683  0.43%  60,720
n 
Industrial death benefit  38  0.02%  9,000  
Total benefits for bereaved people  721  0.46%   
 
Other benefits        
Christmas bonus  153  0.10%  Not available 
Other small benefits  1  0.00%  Not available 
Total other benefits  154  100   
TOTAL  157,987 
     
For notes, see next page. 
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Notes to Table A.1 
a Figures are estimated out-turns. They may not sum exactly due to rounding. 
b Details of the date on which the claimant count for each benefit was taken are given in the relevant part of Section 3 
of this survey. 
c UK expenditure.  
d This is an estimate of UK expenditure for 2007–08 from HMRC’s Revenue and Customs Account, available at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/about/hmrc-dep-acct0708.pdf 
e These figures are taken from HMRC’s Revenue and Customs Account for 2007–08. They represent final entitle-
ments rather than payments made, and thus do not include any impact of overpayments. Total payments made differ 
from final entitlement for working tax credit and child tax credit by £0.5bn, however a detailed split between working 
tax credit and child tax credit is not available Note that, unlike the figures for the number of families (see note f), 
these figures do not include payments made to families receiving the equivalent amounts via out-of-work benefits, 
which are estimated to have totalled £1.7billion in 2007–08 (see footnote 10). Such spending is included within the 
relevant benefits.  
f Number of families, covering 10.1 million children, as at April 2009. This figure includes both in-work families re-
ceiving the child tax credit (4.7 million) and out-of-work families receiving the child tax credit or the equivalent 
amount via out-of-work benefits (1.4 million). Source: National Statistics, Child and Working Tax Credits Statistics: 
April 2009, available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/cwtc-apr09.pdf  
g Data is no longer centrally collated for Statutory Maternity Pay.  
h Figure for December 2008 courtesy of HM Revenue and Customs. 
i These figures are the sum of figures from England,Wales and Scotland for 2007/08 and refer to those that have re-
ceived at least one payment in the year. Source: English figures from Learning and Skills Council, EMA Take Up 
Data July 2008, available at http://www.lsc.gov.uk/aboutus/annualreport/annualreport0708/.  Welsh figures from the 
Welsh assembly government http://www.assemblywales.org/el_3__11-09__p1__fforwm_written_evidence_on-
_ema_-_e.pdf  
   Scottish figures from the Scottish Executive: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Lifelong-learn-
ing/PublicationEMA2007-08 
j Figure courtesy of Department for Work and Pensions 
k  Includes industrial injuries disablement benefit, reduced earnings allowance and retirement allowance (see  Section 
3.5.8 and Appendix B). Claimant figures are as of December 2008; note that more than one assessment may be 
awarded to an individual. Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit Quar-
terly Statistics: December 2008, available at http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/iidb.asp  
Other benefits not included in this figure are the worker’s compensation supplementation scheme and the pneumoco-
niosis, byssinosis and miscellaneous diseases benefit scheme (both payable to people who contracted certain indus-
trial illnesses prior to 5 July 1948). Expenditure on these schemes amounts to around £1 million.  
l Figures include both war disablement and war widow(er)’s pensions. 
m This figure includes claimants of bereavement allowance and widowed parent’s allowance; claimants of the war 
widow’s pension are included in the war pensions statistics (see note l above). 
o Figure for September 08. 
p Expenditure figure for 2008/09 is £140 million (not included in total for 2007-08), forecast only. 
Sources: Department for Work and Pensions, http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd4/medium_term.asp for benefit ex-
penditure information; HMRC’s Revenue and Customs Account for 2006–07, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/about/hmrc-
dep-acct0708.pdf  ; Ministry of Defence, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublica-
tions/AnnualReports/MODAnnualReport0809/ for war pensions expenditure information; Learning and Skills Coun-
cil, http://www.lsc.gov.uk/aboutus/annualreport/annualreport0708/ for education maintenance allowance information. 
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Table A.2 Benefits for Sick and Disabled People 
  Benefit  T  C  M  Claimants, as 
at Feb. 2007a 
Expenditure, 
2006–07 (£m)b 
  Statutory sick pay  ￿  ß  ß  Not available  85 
  Incapacity benefit  ￿  ￿  Part  1,440,930c  6,545 
  Disability living allowance  ß  ß  ß  2,860,790d  9,156 
  Carer’s allowance  ￿  ß  ß  463,500f  1,191 
  Industrial injuries benefits  ß  ß  ß  334,240j  752 
             
             
T = taxable, C = contributory, M = means-tested  
a Unless otherwise specified. 
b Estimated. 
c Recipients (as at February 2007); there were 2,433,400 claimants during the same period, i.e. approximately 60 per 
cent of claimants received an award. Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Incapacity Benefit tabulation tool, 
available at http://83.244.183.180/100pc/ib/tabtool_ib.html 
d  Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Quarterly Statistical Summary: November 2007, available at 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/stats_summary/Stats_Summary_Nov_2007.pdf 
f  Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Quarterly  Statistical Summary: November 2007, available at 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/stats_summary/Stats_Summary_Nov_2007.pdf 
g Includes both war disablement and war widow’s pensions.  
h As at 31 March 2007. Source: Defence Analytical Services Agency, War Pensions – Quarterly Statistics, available 
at www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/pensions/pensionstab11.html. 
I Estimate of planned UK expenditure for year 2006–07. Source: Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Defence: The Gov-
ernment’s Expenditure Plans 2006/2007 to 2007/2008, available at: http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/A556F11A-
E9A4-4330-A96A-898A0B760808/0/gep_0607to0708.pdf 
j Includes industrial injuries disablement benefit, reduced earnings allowance and retirement allowance (see Section 
3.5.7 and Appendix B). Other benefits not included in this figure are the worker’s compensation supplementation 
scheme and the pneumoconiosis, byssinosis and miscellaneous diseases benefit scheme (both payable to people who 
contracted certain industrial illnesses prior to 5 July 1948). Expenditure on these schemes amounts to around £1 mil-
lion. Assessments as of March 2007; note that more than one assessment may be awarded to an individual. Source: 
Department for Work and Pensions, Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit Quarterly Statistics: March 2007, avail-
able at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/iidb/iidb_quarterly_mar07.xls 
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Table A.3 Benefits for Unemployed People 






jobseeker’s allowance  ￿  ß  ￿  716,900c  1,962 
Contribution-based 
jobseeker’s allowance  ￿  ￿  ß  161,100c  478 
             
T = taxable, C = contributory, M = means-tested 
a Unless otherwise specified. 
b Estimated. 
c  Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Jobseeker’s Allowance Claimants tabulation tool, available at 
http://83.244.183.180/5pc/jsa_prim/tabtool_jsa_prim.html 
 
Table A.4 Benefits for People on low incomes 
  Benefit  T  C  M  Claimants, as 
at Feb. 2007a 
Expenditure, 
2006–07 (£m)b 
  Income support  ß  ß  ￿  2,134,170c  6,823 
  Working tax credit  ß  ß  ￿  1,988,000d  6,200e 
  Housing benefit  ß  ß  ￿  4,039,700f  14,858 
  Council tax benefit  ß  ß  ￿  5,096,600f  4,072 
             
           
T = taxable, C = contributory, M = means-tested 
a Unless otherwise specified. 
b Estimated. 
c Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Income Support tabulation tool, available at http://83.244.183.180/-
100pc/is/tabtool_is.html 
d Number of families (including both individuals and couples, regardless of whether they have children), as at April 
2007.  
e  This figure is taken from HMRC’s Resource Accounts and Trust Statement for 2006–07, available at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/about/hmrc-06-07-acc.pdf It represents final entitlements rather than payments made, and 
thus does not include any impact of overpayments. Total payments made exceeded final entitlement for working tax 
credit and child tax credit by £0.7 billion; however, a detailed split between working tax credit and child tax credit is 
not available. The figure relates to UK rather than GB expenditure. 
f Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Housing Benefit & Council Tax Benefit Quarterly Summary Statistics: 
February 2007, available at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/hb_ctb/hb_ctb_quarterly_feb07.asp. 48  IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation? 
Annex B. Income support systems in the UK 
This Annex gives more details of the main income support systems. We follow Minas et 
al (2009), and characterise them into: 
•  Sickness, work accident and disability 
•  Unemployment 
•  benefits for full-time carers 
•  Social assistance  
•  Old-age pensions 
There are no programmes for early retirement.  The Annex also discusses what are 
known in the UK as “extra costs benefits”: child tax credit, disability living allowance 
and housing benefit and council tax benefit. 
B.1 Sickness, work accident and disability 
Statutory sick pay (SSP) is a benefit paid by employers to employees who are incapable 
of work. It is a legal minimum, and many employers pay more than this amount. Almost 
all of the cost of SSP is reclaimed from the government. SSP cannot be claimed by em-
ployees on contracts of less than three months, or if weekly earnings are less than the 
lower earnings limit, currently £87 per week. It is payable at a weekly rate of £72.55, 
and for a maximum of 28 weeks. The total cost of SSP in 2006–07 was estimated to be 
around £85 million, but it is not known how many people received SSP. 
Adults who have no (more) entitlement to SSP and who are incapable of work 
through sickness or disability may be able to claim Employment and Support Allowance 
(ESA). In addition to having “limited capability for work”, adults wishing to claim ESA 
must: 
•  Have made sufficient national insurance contributions, or: 
•  Live in a family which satisfies the means-test, or: 
•  Be under 20. 
ESA can therefore be claimed by adults who have no recent work history or contribu-
tions record, but only if they and their partner satisfy the means-test. The amount of 
ESA payable does not reflect previous earnings. The contributions-based ESA is paid at 
different rates to the means-tested ESA, and it is possible to receive contribution-based IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?  49 
ESA with an means-tested ESA top-up.. A major way in which ESA affects incentives 
to work is that recipients are, in general, not permitted to work while receiving ESA.  
Industrial injuries disablement benefit (IIDB) is payable to individuals who have suf-
fered injury in an industrial accident, or who have contracted an industrial disease while 
at work, and as a result, experience loss of faculty and are consequently considered to 
be at least partially disabled. But spending on ESA (and its predecesssor) is an order of 
magnitude larger than spending on IIDB. 
In addition to these, the main benefit for working-age adults who are disabled is Dis-
ability Living Allowance (DLA). This is intended to cover the additional costs incurred 
by disabled people. It is not based on past contributions, nor is it means-tested, and so 
has minimal impact on incentives to work.  
B.2 Unemployment 
The benefit for unemployed people is known as Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA). Like 
ESA, (and in addition to being out-of-work, being available for work, and looking for 
work), adults wishing to claim JSA must: 
•  Have made sufficient national insurance contributions, or: 
•  Live in a family which satisfies the means-test. 
Contributions-based JSA is payable at a flat-rate (ie unrelated to past earnings), and 
only for 6 months. Income-related JSA is paid at an amount which depends on the 
claimant’s family’s circumstances, and can be paid indefinitely. It is possible to receive 
contribution-based JSA with an income-based JSA top-up. JSA can therefore be 
claimed by adults who have no recent work history or contributions record, but only if 
they and their partner satisfy the means-test.  
All JSA recipients have to be “actively seeking work”, but those who have been 
claiming for long durations will have to enrol in a programme known as the New Deal, 
which can be thought of as an active labour market programme offering greater support 
but with a higher degree of compulsion. As chapter 3 describes, the Government is cur-
rently changing some of these rules as it introduces the Flexible New Deal. 
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•  JSA claimants cannot work 16 or more hours a week (and partners of JSA 
claimants who are claiming income-related JSA cannot work 24 or more hours a 
week) 
•  For work of fewer than 16 hours a week, the income-related JSA has a 100% 
benefit withdrawal rate after a very low disregard. 
This means that JSA claimants have very little financial incentive to work in jobs of 
fewer than 16 hours a week, and – before considering any in-work support such as 
WTC – a substantial disincentive to work more than 16 hours a week. On the other 
hand, JSA recipients should lose their entitlement if they do not take sufficient steps to 
look for work, or they refuse certain job offers. 
B.3 Benefits for full-time carers  
Carer’s allowance (CA), is payable to adults who care full-time for a person who is re-
ceiving certain kinds of disability benefit. Nearly 75 per cent of claimants are female.   
CA affects incentives to work in two ways: 
•  recipients of CA who wish to claim a means-tested top-up may claim IS rather 
than JSA (and therefore are not required to look for work). 
•  recipients of CA may not earn more than £87 per week. 
B.4 Social assistance (Income Support) 
The main social assistance benefit for people who are not in work is Income Support 
(IS). However, as discussed above, the main unemployment and sickness benefits in the 
UK (JSA and ESA) are not pure insurance-based benefits, and have means-tested com-
ponents to them. This means that a better way to think about social assistance in the UK 
is as follows: 
•  non-working adults who are sick or disabled and who want to claim social assis-
tance and should claim ESA; 
•  non-working, non-disabled adults who fall into various categories (mostly full-
time carers) and who want to claim social assistance may claim IS 
•  non-working, non-disabled adults who may not claim IS and who want to claim 
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In general, ESA is the more generous benefit. Entitlement to IS and JSA should gen-
erally be identical: the difference is that JSA recipients have to be actively seeking work 
and can lose their entitlement if they do not satisfy various conditions. 
IS affects incentives to work in the following ways: 
•  IS recipients cannot work 16 or more hours a week  
•  For work of fewer than 16 hours a week, IS has a 100% benefit withdrawal rate 
after a very low disregard. 
This means that IS recipients have very little financial incentive to work in jobs of fewer 
than 16 hours a week, and – before considering any in-work support such as WTC – a 
substantial disincentive to work more than 16 hours a week.  
B.5 Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit 
Housing benefit (HB) is payable to families with low incomes who rent their homes (for 
families who own their own homes, mortgage interest payments may be met through 
means-tested JSA or IS). People on IS or the means-tested JSA are entitled to the full 
level of HB. For other claimants, the amount of HB payable depends upon income in 
much the same way as for IS or income-based JSA. 
The amount of HB actually received depends on the claimant’s household income 
and the level of rent.  Council tax benefit (CTB) is payable to families with low incomes 
who are liable to pay council tax on a property in which they are resident. Many of the 
conditions for claiming are the same as those for HB. People on IS, income-based JSA 
or the guarantee element of the pension credit are automatically passported to maximum 
CTB.  
B.6 The child and working tax credit 
The child tax credit (CTC) is a means-tested cash payment for families with children. is 
made up of a number of elements: a family element, a baby element (for families with a 
child under the age of 1), a child element, a disabled child additional element and a se-
verely disabled child supplement. Entitlement to CTC does not depend on employment 
status, but does require that the claimant be responsible for at least one child under the 
age of 16 (or aged 16–19 and in full-time education). Around 9 out of 10 families with 
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Working tax credit (WTC) provides in-work support for low-paid working adults. 
Families with children, and workers with a disability, are eligible for WTC provided at 
least one adult works 16 or more hours per week. Workers with no children and no dis-
ability are only eligible if they are aged 25 or over and work at least 30 hours per week. 
There is a basic element, with an extra payment for couples and lone parents (i.e. for 
everyone except childless single people), as well as an additional payment for those 
working at least 30 hours per week (30 hours in total for couples). WTC also includes 
supplementary payments for disability, severe disability and those over 50 returning to 
work.  
CTC and WTC are subject to a single means test operating at the family level.  
B.7. Disability Living Allowance 
This is a non-means-tested, non-contributory benefit available to people with long-term 
illnesses or disabilities. It does not depend on the work status of the claimant. DLA is 
paid if claimants need to be cared for, or have mobility problems.  
B.8 Old-age pensions 
The focus of this paper is working-age adults, so old-age pensions are not discussed in 
detail. The main points are that: 
•  The basic state pension is payable at age 65 for men, and age 60 for women (this 
will be equalised with men between 2010 and 2020).  
•  There is no earnings-test to the basic state pension, and so recipients may con-
tinue to work. This means that the only impact on incentives to work is through 
an “income effect”. Individuals may defer receipt, in return for a lump-sum or 
permanently higher state pension, but few actively do. Because people can re-
ceive the state pension and work, the decision about whether to defer is mostly 
an investment decision, although people may wish to consider the timing of their 
income.  
•  From age 60, both men and women are entitled to a substantially more generous 
form of social assistance (known as Pension Credit).  
There is no form of early retirement pension, although individuals with private pensions 
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Annex C. More example budget constraints 
Figure C.1 Budget constraints for couple with children without HB, 2009–2010 tax and 
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Figure C.2 Budget constraints for couple with children with HB/CTB, 2009-2010 tax 
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Figure C.3 Budget constraints for singles no children without HB, 2009–2010 tax and 
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Figure C.4 Budget constraints for singles no children with HB/CTB, 2009-2010 tax and 
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Figure C.5 Budget constraints for couple without children without HB, 2009–2010 tax 
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Figure C.6 Budget constraints for couple without children with HB/CTB, 2009–2010 tax 
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Table C.1 Replacement Ratios at various levels of gross earnings; 2008/9 tax and 
benefit system, low rent levels 
Family 
Type 
Gross  weekly earnings (minimum wage was £5.52 and £5.73 over this 
period) 
£100  £125  £150  £175  £200  £225  £250  £275  £300  £325  £350 
Single person (aged 25+) 
  85.6  81.9  77.5  68.3  57.1  49.1  43.1  38.4  34.6  31.5  28.9 
Lone parent with no childcare costs 
1 child  73.4  71.1  69.6  66.9  64.5  62.2  60.1  58.1  56.3  54.6  52.9 
2 children  82.4  81.2  80.3  79.4  77.2  74.9  72.8  70.8  68.9  67.1  65.4 
Lone parent with child care costs £100 pw 
1 child  75.3  74.0  73.6  73.1  72.2  71.2  69.7  67.1  64.6  62.3  60.2 
2 children  84.0  82.9  82.5  82.1  81.7  81.2  80.3  79.4  77.3  75.0  72.9 
Married couple with no children 
  95.0  88.4  86.4  84.4  82.5  79.8  70.1  62.2  55.9  50.7  46.5 
Married couple without WTC 30 hour credit 
1 child  84.7  83.4  83.0  82.5  82.1  80.2  77.7  75.1  72.6  70.3  68.2 
2 children  90.7  89.6  89.2  88.8  88.4  88.0  87.2  85.2  83.3  81.3  79.2 
3 children  93.3  92.4  92.0  91.7  91.4  91.0  90.3  88.6  86.9  85.2  83.3 
Married couple with WTC 30 hour credit and children 
1 child  n/a  n/a  n/a  80.5  78.0  75.4  72.9  70.6  68.4  66.4  64.5 
2 children  n/a  n/a  n/a  88.1  87.4  85.4  83.5  81.6  79.4  77.4  75.5 
3 children  n/a  n/a  n/a  91.1  90.5  88.8  87.1  85.4  83.5  81.7  80.0 
Source: Table 2.3a of “Tax Benefit Model Tables: April 2008”, http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/tbmt.asp  
Notes: based on net income after paying rent and council tax. Assumes social housing tenant in receipt of Jobseeker's 
Allowance when out of work. n/a means weekly earnings imply sub-minimum wage work at 30 hours a week. 
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Table C.2 Replacement Ratios at various levels of gross earnings; 2008/9 tax and 
benefit system, high rent levels 
Family 
Type 
Gross  weekly earnings (minimum wage was £5.52 and £5.73 over this 
period) 
£100  £125  £150  £175  £200  £225  £250  £275  £300  £325  £350 
Single person (aged 25+) 
  85.6  81.9  77.5  71.9  67.1  62.9  59.2  55.9  52.9  48.3  42.5 
Lone parent with no childcare costs 
1 child  73.4  71.1  70.2  69.9  68.3  67.4  66.5  65.6  64.8  63.9  63.1 
2 children  82.4  81.2  80.3  79.4  78.5  77.7  76.9  76.1  75.3  74.5  73.8 
Lone parent with child care costs £100 pw 
1 child  75.3  74.0  73.6  73.1  72.2  71.2  70.2  69.2  68.3  67.4  66.5 
2 children  84.0  82.9  82.5  82.1  81.7  81.2  80.3  79.4  78.6  77.8  76.9 
Married couple with no children 
  95.0  88.4  86.4  84.4  82.5  80.7  77.3  73.7  70.4  67.4  64.6 
Married couple without WTC 30 hour credit 
1 child  84.7  83.4  83.0  82.5  82.1  81.6  80.9  79.8  78.9  77.9  77.0 
2 children  90.7  89.6  89.2  88.8  88.4  88.0  87.7  87.3  86.9  86.3  85.4 
3 children  93.3  92.4  92.0  91.7  91.4  91.0  90.7  90.4  90.1  89.5  88.8 
Married couple with WTC 30 hour credit and children 
1 child  n/a  n/a  n/a  81.7  81.0  80.0  79.0  78.0  77.1  76.1  75.2 
2 children  n/a  n/a  n/a  88.1  87.7  87.3  86.9  86.4  85.5  84.7  83.9 
3 children  n/a  n/a  n/a  91.1  90.7  90.4  90.1  89.6  88.9  88.1  87.4 
Source: Table 2.3b of “Tax Benefit Model Tables: April 2008”, http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/tbmt.asp  
Notes: based on net income after paying rent and council tax. Assumes social housing tenant in receipt of Jobseeker's 
Allowance when out of work. n/a means weekly earnings imply sub-minimum wage work at 30 hours a week.  
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Annex D. The distribution of participation tax rates in the 
UK 
Figure D.1 Cumulative distribution of participation tax rates in the UK in 2009–10 
 
Notes: Calculations for personal direct and indirect taxes only: excludes most ‘business taxes’ (notably corporation 
tax and business rates but not employer NI), and capital taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains 
tax). Non-workers are imputed a wage. Excludes those over the state pension age. 














































Figure D.2 Cumulative distribution of replacement rates in the UK in 2009–10 
 
Notes: See figure D.1 
Source: See figure D.1 











































IFAU – How do income-support systems in the UK affect labour force participation?0F*  63 
 




Notes: See figure D.1. Of the 34.8 million adults in the UK who are below the state pension age, 8.6 million are sin-
gle without children, 2 million are lone parents, 9.5 million are members of couples with children whose partner 
works, 2.3 million are members of couples with children whose partner does not work, 10.3 million are members of 
couples without children whose partner works, and 3.8 million are members of couples without children whose part-
ner does not work. 
Source: As figure D.1 
 
   
                                                 








































Participation tax rate Single, no children
Lone Parent
Couple with children, partner works
Couple with children, partner doesn't work
Couple without children, partner works
Couple without children, partner doesn't work 
 
  
Table D.1 Participation tax rates of non-workers 
    10
th centile  30
th centile  50
th centile  70
th centile  90
th centile  Number of people  % within person-type  % within benefit recipients 
Single adult 
Disabled  53  63  73  80  87          787,257   35%  27% 
Carer  52  57  66  74  78            56,669   2%  7% 
Contributory JSA  49  58  67  76  89            94,779   4%  35% 
JSA/IS  46  51  61  75  88          698,740   31%  32% 
NOTA  28  38  44  51  65          640,517   28%  16% 
Lone parent 
Disabled  62  70  74  80  87            94,624   9%  3% 
Carer  49  55  74  81  85            55,320   5%  7% 
Contributory JSA  44  66  71  74  82            20,869   2%  8% 
JSA/IS  49  64  72  77  83          736,779   71%  33% 




Disabled  43  57  64  71  86          186,841   9%  6% 
Carer  50  53  58  62  71            64,018   3%  8% 
Contributory JSA  46  48  57  65  88            33,684   2%  12% 
JSA/IS  46  47  50  52  57          149,789   7%  7% 





Disabled  70  75  81  88  90          185,348   24%  6% 
Carer  71  75  87  89  93            50,248   7%  6% 
Contributory JSA  78  83  85  87  93            42,351   6%  16% 
JSA/IS  51  71  78  83  89          432,188   57%  20% 




Disabled  40  53  58  63  80          389,253   21%  14% 
Carer  39  46  50  51  59            45,617   2%  6% 
Contributory JSA  32  32  54  54  54              9,358   1%  3% 
JSA/IS  47  51  53  56  73          145,593   8%  7% 
NOTA  30  38  42  47  57        1,238,921   68%  31% 




Disabled  53  65  73  84  91          510,169   31%  18% 
Carer  51  59  66  73  85            71,161   4%  9% 
Contributory JSA  15  52  53  72  85            49,838   3%  18% 
JSA/IS  47  62  69  82  91          331,693   20%  15% 
NOTA  35  42  46  51  63          674,911   41%  17% 
All              9,647,241     
Notes: Calculations for personal direct and indirect taxes only: excludes most ‘business taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates but not employer NI), and capital taxes 
(notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax). In-work incomes for non-workers calculated as described in section 2.4. Excludes those over the state pension age. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN run on uprated data from the 2005–06 EFS. Uses same data as Adam and Browne (2009). Publication series published by the Institute for Labour Market Policy 
Evaluation (IFAU)  –  latest issues 
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